



Institute for  
**New Economic Thinking**  
AT THE OXFORD MARTIN SCHOOL



Smith School  
of Enterprise and  
the Environment



# A new perspective on decarbonising the global energy system.

Oxford Energy Seminar 12th October 2021

*Prof J. Doyne Farmer, Dr Rupert Way &  
Dr Matthew Ives*



# Overview

What are decision-makers being told about climate mitigation pathways?

What is wrong with this story?

Is there a better perspective?


What is the cost of decarbonising the global energy system?

Socio-technical transitions, regional differences and emission pathways

Conclusions



# “Stopping climate change will be slow or very expensive”



Source: Global Carbon Project (2017) and Bank of England (2018)

To achieve  $< 2$  degrees:

- Economic growth must suffer
- We may need to reduce our energy usage
- We need to build 13Gt or more of Carbon Capture and Storage plants by 2100
- Electricity prices are likely to be higher

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

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# Performance of IEA and IAMs



Source: Way et al. 2021

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

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# Evolution of the global energy landscape



- Oil (price)
- Coal (price)
- Gas (price)
- Coal electricity
- Gas electricity
- Traditional biomass
- Nuclear electricity
- Hydropower
- Biopower
- Wind electricity
- Solar PV electricity
- Batteries (lifetime-adjusted)
- P2X fuel from solar and wind (modelled)


# Technological change

- Technologies improve at very different rates
- The rates are highly persistent
- This is only clear with granular data

***Hypothesis:*** We can make far better predictions of long-term growth using fine-grained models.




# Heterogeneity of Technological progress



# Consumer goods

## 20 Years of Price Changes in The United States Selected Consumer Goods & Services, Wages (January 1998 to December 2018)



Article & Sources:  
<https://howmuch.net/articles/price-changes-in-usa-in-past-20-years>  
CPI and other price indices - Bureau of Labor Statistics - <https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/cu>  
Average hourly earnings - Bureau of Labor Statistics - <https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES0500000008>

howmuch.net

Thanks to Jangho Yang

# How to take advantage of persistence and heterogeneity of technological change?

**Make use of empirical laws.**







# Wright's Law (1936)




Cost vs. cumulative production follows a power law:  $y = x^{-\alpha}$



### Moore




### Wright



# Cause and effect?


- Do lower costs cause higher production or does higher production cause lower costs?
- Studied US production in World War II (Lafond, Greenwald, Farmer)
- Causality is reasonably clear
- Cumulative production (experience) explains about half; overall trend explains the other half

# How to make forecasts: the stochastic experience curve



- Reformulate Wright's law as a time series model (Lafond et al, 2018)


# How to make forecasts: the stochastic experience curve



- Pretend to be at a given time in the past
- Forecast each “future” date
- Repeat for all past dates
- Score methods based on forecasting errors

Assume process is same for all technologies, but parameters differ


# How to make forecasts: the stochastic experience curve



Tested by  
making 6,000  
forecasts for  
50 different  
Technologies

- Provides experience curve forecasts with reliable error bars
- Forecasts are scenario-dependent: the more we produce, the higher our probability of moving down the experience curve

# Distributional forecast of solar PV assuming business as usual



# Contrasting forecasts of solar energy costs

*“Solar power is by far the most expensive way to reduce carbon emissions.”*


*The Economist (2014)*

*“For projects with low-cost financing that tap high-quality resources, solar PV is now the cheapest source of electricity in history.”*

*International Energy Agency (2020)*


## CHANGING ENERGY COSTS

The price of solar power continues to plummet; its cost is projected to fall below those of nuclear and coal.



Projected wind and solar costs include compressed air energy storage; historical solar costs do not. Coal cost includes carbon capture and sequestration. Nuclear subsidies not included.

# Energy technology costs improve at different rates



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



# Designing an energy system model around the data

- We know how to make reliable forecasts for single techs: AR(1), Wright's law
- How do we combine forecasts to say something about the full system?
- Need a system model: lots of techs, in suitable quantities (scenarios)

- Note key features of forecasts:

- Data-intensive
- Probabilistic
- Scenario-dependent




- These lead to different design than other models

## Model philosophy / wish list


- Simple to understand and communicate
  - Closely tied to data
  - Easy to update with new data
  - Quick to run, test, experiment
  - Represent all the most important parts of the energy system
  - Faithfully represent technology dynamics (costs, growth rates, substitutions...)
  - *Reliable, trustworthy*
- > Want as few variables as possible while retaining sufficient realism
- > Major bottleneck is data, we spent a lot of time on this

# In contrast: an Integrated Assessment Model (IMAGE)

Image 3.0 in detail



## Energy system



## What data exists?

Technology	Data	Cost trend	Forecast model
Oil, coal, gas	~100 years	Flat	AR(1)
Coal & gas electricity	~40 years	Flat	AR(1)
Nuclear power	~40 years	Flat / increasing	Wright
Hydropower, biopower	10-20 years	Weak progress / flat	Wright
PV, wind, Li-ion batteries, PEM electrolysers	10-50 years	Strong progress	Wright

- Data exists for global costs and global production, not regional
- Limited data: CCS, biofuels, traditional biomass, heat, pumped storage, marine, tidal, geothermal, concentrated solar, *flow batteries, electricity networks*

## How we choose which technologies to include in the model

1. *Data availability* – can only use techs with sufficient data
2. *System coverage* – techs with large production
3. *System dynamics* – techs with large growth rates
4. *Flexibility & functionality* – energy storage, transport & conversion techs

## How we choose which technologies to include in the model

1. *Data availability* – can only use techs with sufficient data
2. *System coverage* – techs with large production
  - Primary fuels: crude oil, coal, gas
  - Electricity: coal, gas, nuclear, hydropower, biopower
3. *System dynamics* – techs with large growth rates
  - *Wind, PV, others below*
4. *Flexibility & functionality* – energy storage, transport & conversion techs
  - Batteries (Li-ion and VRF), electrolyzers (PEM), electricity networks

What do we exclude? CCS, geo, biofuels, traditional biomass, marine, tidal, geothermal, CSP, petrochemical feedstock (plastics), pumped storage

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
## How other models construct scenarios

- Co-“construct” costs and deployment – they *forecast* both things at once
- Small early errors get magnified over time
- Some use endogenous technological learning (but with point forecasts)
- Can be myopic or optimize over longer time horizon
- Impose extra ad hoc constraints (floor costs, deployment growth constraints, deployment limits etc...)
- Their past record is very bad for fast moving techs
- Hard to make scenarios match past or current trends

## How we construct scenarios


- **Exogenously and based on empirical trends**
  - 1) 14 technologies / 5 energy carriers / 4 sectors
  - 2) Key assumption: total useful energy grows at 2% (and within sectors)
  - 3) Allow different combinations of techs to grow at current rates for around a decade, then relax back to system-wide rate
  - 4) ... subject to a few extra constraints:
    - Electrification % is capped (per sector) - some fuels are still provided
    - VRE deployment matched by long- and short-term storage, fixed %
- NB. Scenarios are exogenous - not constructed by optimization

# Our system model




# How we construct scenarios by letting trends continue

## Clean tech growth rates continue for a decade




## Fossil fuel growth rates continue




- |  |  |  |   |
|--|--|--|---|
|  P2X fuel         |  Nuclear    |  Wind     |  Daily batteries (grid plus transport) |
|  Coal electricity |  Hydropower |  Solar PV |  Multi-day storage                     |
|  Gas electricity  |  Biopower   |  |   |

# Focus on three scenarios




# Forecasts generated by our scenarios


## Solar




## Batteries




- Observed global average technology costs
- Probabilistic Wright's law forecast under Fast Transition scenario (median, 50% C.I. and 95% C.I.)
- High progress IAM or IEA cost projections
- Probabilistic AR(1) forecast (median, 50% C.I. and 95% C.I.)



# Results - median expenditures on each technology



# Results – relative net present costs of scenarios



## Obvious discussion points to come back to...

- Model granularity (technologies, geography) – what level is best?
  - Sub-techs, tech vintages, regional diversity in costs
- Storage and electrification %s (our own “ad hoc” assumptions)
- Tech surprises – what can’t we predict?
- We made consistently pessimistic assumptions re costs and performance of clean technologies (e.g. assume FF costs don’t rise, no DSM)
- Interpretation – we don’t say *how* to achieve any scenario... policy
- New techs likely to make a fast transition even cheaper – structural batteries, grid-forming inverters, hot-rock storage...

# What is the cost of decarbonising the global energy system?

- **Commonly assumed that clean energy transition will be very expensive.**
- **But wind, solar have dropped in price for many decades, in contrast to coal, oil, gas, nuclear...**
- **Converting to renewables plus storage quickly is likely to deliver net savings, above and beyond climate change mitigation benefits**

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
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
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# Socio-technical transitions and experience curves




(Geels 2019)



# Renewables cheaper than fossil fuels within 5 years for China and US


Figure 3.5 Detailed breakdown of utility-scale solar PV total installed costs by country, 2019

Figure 3.3 Total installed PV system cost and weighted averages for utility-scale systems, 2010-2019




Source: IRENA Renewable Cost Database.

## United States




## China



Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance


# Green Energy Potential: Solar

Most solar capacity is situated in China (255 GW), the United States (76 GW), Japan (68 GW), Germany (54 GW), and India (39 GW)




© 2019 The World Bank  
Source: Global Solar Atlas 2.0  
Solar resource data: Solargis

Long-term average of photovoltaic power potential (PVOUT)




# Green Energy Potential: Wind

Most wind capacity is situated in China (288 GW), the United States (122 GW), Germany (62 GW), and India (39 GW)




# Paris compliance will still require effort on non-energy emissions


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
b



c



# The IPCC story of meeting the Paris goals seems unachievable




Source: Global Carbon Project (2017) and Bank of England (2018)

To achieve < 2 degrees:

- Economic growth will suffer
- We may need to reduce our energy usage
- We need to build a Carbon Capture and Storage plant every 3 days to 2100
- Electricity prices are likely to be higher

# Aligns the energy system with the Paris goals for much less cost



## The Decisive Transition is:

- No reduction in economic growth required
- No reduction in energy use applied
- Carbon Capture and Storage not used
- Electricity prices ~ *one third* of “business-as-usual”

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


# Conclusions

- There is an opportunity to change the “mood music” being played to decision makers
- Continued strong growth in investment in key renewable and storage technologies over the next decade will:
  - Put us on track to meet the Paris emission reduction goals
  - Cost trillions less than business as usual
  - Need not reduce economic prosperity
  - And could make electricity much cheaper for everyone
- COP26 offers an opportunity for a *Glasgow Accord* on action - decisive support for renewables + storage now will pay huge dividends

# Oxford Integrated Climate Economics Model

- Modular by design
- Empirically grounded, verified & tested
- Driven by micro level data
- Enables simulations based on model predictions for policy exploration



# Thank you

